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Introduction
Cournot tâtonnement is the oldest and one of the most natural dynamic scenarios of individual myopic adaptation in strategic games. It has been studied in various contexts and from various viewpoints, see, e.g., Topkis (1979) , Bernheim (1984) , Moulin (1984) , Vives (1990) , Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , Kandori and Rob (1995) , and Milchtaich (1996) .
The introduction of the concept of a potential game by Monderer and Shapley (1996) stimulated studies of similarities and dissimilarities between better and best response dynamics. Since Monderer and Shapley paid most attention to the cardinal concept of an exact potential, they defined every kind of a potential as a real-valued function. When Voorneveld (2000) introduced a "best-response potential," he followed their lead. For a finite game, the restriction to numeric potentials is innocuous; in the general case, it is not so. And yet, nobody has demonstrated so far that the possibility of a numeric representation has anything to do with improvement dynamics.
Voorneveld's definition is over-exacting in another respect too, viz. it followed Monderer and Shapley's concept of an ordinal potential rather than a generalized ordinal one. Meanwhile, Monderer and Shapley (1996, Lemma 2.5) showed that it is the latter kind of a potential that is most relevant to the convergence of adaptive dynamics. Kukushkin (2004, Section 6 ) defined a "Cournot potential" as a partial order on the set of strategy profiles with respect to which every best response improvement by a single player pushes the current strategy profile upwards. In a finite game, the existence of such an order is equivalent to the "finite best response property" (Milchtaich, 1996) . Naturally, Voorneveld's potential always defines a Cournot potential; the converse is generally wrong, even in a finite game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996 , the example on p. 129).
When attention is turned to infinite games, the acyclicity of (either better or best response) improvements does not imply even the existence of a Nash equilibrium, to say nothing of the convergence of adaptive dynamics. Nonetheless, the main theorem of Kukushkin (2011) showed that in a game with compact strategy sets and "continuous enough" preferences, the acyclicity of all individual improvements ensures the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium and the possibility to reach it (perhaps, approximately) with a unilateral improvement path. The acyclicity of only the best response improvements, however, does not ensure even the mere existence of a Nash equilibrium, even in a compact-continuous two-person game (Kukushkin, 2011, Example 1) .
In this paper, we assume that the strategy sets are compact metric spaces, and study what topological conditions should be added to the definition of a Cournot potential in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium or, additionally, the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in the limit (or as a cluster point) of a best response improvement path. Roughly speaking, we consider two such additional requirements: ω-transitivity, and ω-transitivity plus lower semicontinuity. The first ensures the existence of an equilibrium (as well as "transfinite convergence" to equilibria of all best response improvement paths). The second, the possibility to reach the set of Nash equilibria in the limit of a best response improvement path -an infinitary version of the weak FBRP (Milchtaich, 1996) -and convergence to the set of Nash equilibria of all best response improvement paths in the case of two players.
We do not require the utility functions to be continuous, only assume that the best responses exist everywhere; a well-known sufficient condition for this is the upper semicontinuity of each utility function in own choice. Quite often, the upper hemicontinuity of the best response correspondences also helps; a sufficient condition for that is the upper semicontinuity of each utility function in the total strategy profile and continuity in the choices of others.
While the acyclicity of best response improvements can be shown by reductio ad absurdum, as in Theorem 2 of Kandori and Rob (1995) or Theorem 1 of Kukushkin (2004) , it is difficult to imagine how the existence of, say, a continuous Cournot potential could be established without producing one explicitly. Fortunately, there are natural classes of strategic games where this is possible; two of them are briefly described in this paper. In the first example, "games with structured utilities," there is even an exact (at least, an ordinal) potential as defined by Monderer and Shapley (1996) , hence the behavior of all individual improvement paths is rather regular. In the second, "aggregative games," arbitrary improvements may lead nowhere. Sequential Cournot tâtonnement in such games was considered by Jensen (2010) , but his results are not directly comparable to ours, see Section 9.5.
In Section 2, the basic definitions are given. Section 3 contains the main "positive" results; Section 4, additional "positive" results which assume the uniqueness of the best responses. In Section 5, we introduce two weaker notions of a potential, which broaden the scope of applications. Sections 6 and 7 present known classes of games where the assumptions of (some of) our theorems are satisfied. Section 8 contains "negative" results, showing the impossibility of easy generalizations. A discussion of various related questions in Section 9 concludes the paper. 2 
Preliminaries
Our basic model is a strategic game with ordinal utilities. It is defined by a finite set of players N , and strategy sets X i and ordinal utility functions u i :
Given a strategy profile x N ∈ X N and i ∈ N , we denote x i and x −i its projections to X i and X −i , respectively; a pair (x i , x −i ) uniquely determines x N . In the case of #N = 2, we denote −i the partner/rival of player i.
Defining the best response correspondence R i : X −i → 2 X i for each i ∈ N in the usual way,
Every Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of
The existence of a Cournot potential is equivalent to the absence of Cournot cycles, i.e., Cournot paths ⟨x 0 N , x 1 N , . . . , x m N ⟩ such that m > 0 and x 0 N = x m N . If the game is finite, this fact implies that every Cournot path, if continued whenever possible, reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. Example 1 from Kukushkin (2011) shows that a compact-continuous game may admit a Cournot potential and still possess no Nash equilibrium, to say nothing of the convergence of Cournot paths.
Henceforth, we assume that each X i is a compact metric space and endow X N with, say, the maximum metric. We do not impose any explicit continuity-style restriction on the utilities; all assumptions are formulated in terms of the best response correspondences. In particular, we assume throughout that R i (x −i ) ̸ = ∅ for every i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i . The upper semicontinuity of u i in own choice x i is sufficient for that though by no means necessary. In many results, we assume that each R i is upper hemicontinuous. A sufficient condition for that is the upper semicontinuity of u i in x N and continuity in x −i .
Let ≻ be a binary relation on a metric space X. An improvement path of ≻ is a (finite or infinite) It turns out that two properties of a Cournot potential are most relevant for the questions we address here: ω-transitivity and the conjunction of ω-transitivity and lower semicontinuity. These two simple statements are helpful in the following. Lemma 2.1. Let ≻ be an ω-transitive binary relation on a metric space X. Let x ω ∈ X be a cluster point of an infinite improvement path ⟨x k ⟩ k∈N of ≻. Then x ω ≻ x k for all k ∈ N.
Proof. By the transitivity of ≻, we have x h ≻ x k whenever h > k. Since x ω is a cluster point, there is a strictly increasing sequence ⟨k h ⟩ h∈N such that
Lemma 2.2. Let Γ be a strategic game where each X i is a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Let ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N be an infinite Cournot path and X ω ⊆ X N be the set of its cluster points. Then
.
(3)
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, we have x ω N ≻ x k N for each k ∈ N. If we supposed that y ω N ≻ x ω N , we would have x k N ≻ x ω N whenever x k N is close enough to y ω N by the lower semicontinuity, i.e., a contradiction.
A (finite or infinite) sequence ⟨x k N ⟩ k=0,1,... in X N converges to a subset Y ⊆ X N if either it is finite and ends at x m N ∈ Y or it is infinite and all its cluster points belong to Y .
Main theorems
Theorem 3.1. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential. Then Γ possesses a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) , there exists a maximizer x 0 N of the potential ≻ on X N . By (2), x 0 N is also a maximizer of ◃ BR on X N , i.e., a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. Let Γ be a strategic game where #N = 2, each X i is a compact metric space, and each R i is upper hemicontinuous. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻. Let ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N be an infinite Cournot path. Then there is a Nash equilibrium among cluster points of the path.
Proof. We denote X ω ⊆ X N the set of cluster points of ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N and pick a maximizer x ω N of ≻ on X ω ; it exists by Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) since X ω is compact. As in the proof of Lemma 2.1, we pick a strictly increasing sequence ⟨k h ⟩ h∈N such that x k h N → x ω N . Since N is finite, we may, without restricting generality, assume that x k h i ∈ R i (x k h −i ) for an i ∈ N and all h. Then we denote y h (2), contradicting the choice of x ω N . Thus, x ω N is a Nash equilibrium indeed.
Remark. The assumption that each R i is upper hemicontinuous cannot simply be dropped, see Example 8.1 below. Example 8.5, due to Powell (1973) , shows the same for the assumption #N = 2.
Lemma 3.3. Let a strategic game Γ satisfy all assumptions of Lemma 2.2, and let each R i be upper hemicontinuous. Let ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N be an infinite Cournot path, X ω ⊆ X N be the set of its cluster points, and x ω N ∈ X ω . Then x ω i ∈ R i (x ω −i ) for at least two different players i ∈ N .
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we pick a strictly increasing sequence ⟨k h ⟩ h∈N such that
, and that y ω −j = x ω −j . By the upper hemicontinuity of R i and R j , we have
Theorem 3.4. Let Γ be a strategic game where #N = 2, each X i is a compact metric space, and each R i is upper hemicontinuous. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Then every Cournot path converges to the set of Nash equilibria.
Immediately follows from Lemma 3.3.
Remark. All assumptions are essential here as Examples 8.1, 8.3, and 8.5 show.
Theorem 3.5. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space and each R i be upper hemicontinuous. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Then for every x 0 N ∈ X N there exists a Cournot path starting at x 0 N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Given x 0 N ∈ X N , we recursively define a Cournot path ⟨x k N ⟩ k . If x k N is a Nash equilibrium, the process stops, and we are home. Otherwise, we define N * (k) :
Assuming the path infinite, we denote X ω ⊆ X N the set of its cluster points. Supposing, to the contrary, that
Theorem 3.6. Let Γ be a strategic game where #N = 2 and each X i is a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Then for every x 0 N ∈ X N there exists a Cournot path starting at x 0 N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Given x 0 N ∈ X N , we recursively define a Cournot path ⟨x k N ⟩ k in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.5. Assuming the path infinite, we again denote X ω ⊆ X N the set of its cluster points.
Supposing, to the contrary, that
Without restricting generality, we may assume that either
In the first case, we obtain a contradiction in exactly the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
In the second case, we notice that
Remark. Example 8.2 shows that the assumption that each R i is upper hemicontinuous in Theorem 3.5, as well as the assumption #N = 2 in Theorem 3.6, cannot simply be dropped.
Unique best responses
It turns out that the uniqueness of the best responses allows us to dispense with the upper hemicontinuity of R i in almost all results of the preceding section, and also obtain a couple of new results without analogs in a more general case. Throughout this section, we use the notation
Proof. Suppose the contrary:
Theorem 4.2. Let Γ be a strategic game where #N = 2 and each X i is a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Let ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N be a Cournot path and X ω ⊆ X N be the set of its cluster points.
Then ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N converges to the set of Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.3. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space and let #R i (x −i ) = 1 for all i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i . Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Then for every x 0 N ∈ X N there exists a Cournot path starting at x 0 N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
In both cases, the proofs virtually repeat those of Theorems 3.4 and 3.5, respectively, only references to the upper hemicontinuity of R i should be replaced with those to Lemma 4.1.
We call a Cournot path ⟨x
Thus, a totally inclusive path either is infinite or ends at a Nash equilibrium. We call an infinite Cournot path ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N uniformly inclusive if there is a natural number m ∈ N such that for
. Every infinite Cournot path generated by the sequential tâtonnement process as defined by Moulin (1984, p. 87 ), see also Jensen (2010, Theorem 2) , is uniformly inclusive with m = #N − 1.
Theorem 4.4. Let Γ be a strategic game where each X i is a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Let ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N be a uniformly inclusive Cournot path and X ω ⊆ X N be the set of its cluster points.
Proof of Claim 4.4.1. We argue by induction in s. For s = 0, the definition of ⟨k h ⟩ h∈N suffices. The general induction step is identical with the case of s = 1. Since X N is compact and N is finite, for
Let us fix i ∈ N . Since the path is uniformly inclusive, there is an s ∈ {0, . . . , m} for each h ∈ N such that x k h +s i = r i (x k h +s −i ). By Claim 4.4.1, for every δ > 0 there ish ∈ N such that the distance between x k h +s N and x ω N is less than δ for each s ∈ {0, . . . , m} and h >h. Therefore, there is a strictly
Remark. If #N = 2, then every infinite Cournot path is uniformly inclusive (with m = 1); Theorem 4.4 in this case becomes identical to Theorem 4.2. The reverse replacement of the uniqueness of the best responses with their upper hemicontinuity in Theorem 4.4 would make it wrong (for #N > 2) as Example 8.5 shows.
Theorem 4.5. Let Γ be a strategic game where #N = 3 and each X i is a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive Cournot potential ≻ which is also lower semicontinuous. Let ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N be an infinite totally inclusive Cournot path and X ω ⊆ X N be the set of its cluster points.
Then X ω contains a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For each i ∈ N , we denote X i the set of x ω N ∈ X ω for which there exists a strictly increasing
For each pair I ⊂ N , #I = 2, we denote X I := ∩ i∈I X i . Whenever I ̸ = J, X I ∩X J consists of Nash equilibria. By Lemma 3.3, modified as described after Lemma 4.1, X ω = ∪ I X I . Since the path is inclusive, X i ̸ = ∅ for each i ∈ N ; hence at least two sets X I are nonempty too.
Assuming, to the contrary, that X ω contains no Nash equilibrium, we must have X I ∩ X J = ∅ for all pairs I ̸ = J. Since each X I is closed, there are open subsets V I such that X I ⊆ V I for each I and V I ∩ V J = ∅ whenever I ̸ = J. Without restricting generality, we may assume that x k N ∈ ∪ I V I for all k. Therefore, there exist I ̸ = J and a strictly increasing sequence ⟨k h ⟩ h∈N such that
Remark. Example 8.6 below shows that one could not assert that every x ω N ∈ X ω in Theorem 4.5 is a Nash equilibrium. Example 8.7, that even this theorem would be wrong for #N > 3.
Weaker concepts
To broaden the scope of applications, we introduce two weaker notions: a "partial Cournot potential" and a "restricted Cournot potential." In the first case, we require (2) to hold only for some pairs x N , y N ∈ X N ; in the second, (2) is required to hold for "admissible" best responses only. Both weakenings can be combined, naturally, defining a "partial restricted Cournot potential." The implications of the presence of a Cournot potential in a weaker sense are weaker too, but not very much.
We call a subset X 0 ⊆ X N BR-closed if it satisfies the following conditions.
1. If y N ◃ BR x N and x N ∈ X 0 , then y N ∈ X 0 too.
2. If ⟨x k N ⟩ k∈N is an infinite Cournot path, x ω N is its cluster point, and x k N ∈ X 0 for each k, then x ω N ∈ X 0 . We call an irreflexive and transitive binary relation ≻ on X N a partial Cournot potential if there is a BR-closed subset ∅ ̸ = X 0 ⊆ X N such that (2) holds whenever x N ∈ X 0 (hence y N ∈ X 0 too).
Theorem 5.1. Lemmas 2.2 and 3.3, as well as Theorems 3. 2, 3.4, 4.2, 4.4 and 4 .5 remain valid if the "Cournot potential" in each of them is replaced with "partial Cournot potential" whereas every Cournot path mentioned is contained in X 0 . In Lemma 4.1, the conditions that x k N ∈ X 0 for all k and x ω N ∈ X 0 should be added too.
A straightforward proof is omitted. Other results from Section 3 need a more careful treatment.
Theorem 5.2. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive partial Cournot potential such that either X 0 is closed, or the condition
holds. Then Γ possesses a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In the first case, we invoke Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. In the second case, we start with picking an x N ∈ X 0 . If x N is a maximizer of ≻ on X N , then it is a Nash equilibrium by (2) . Otherwise, by the same Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) , there is a maximizer y N of ≻ on X N such that y N ≻ x N . By our assumption, y N ∈ X 0 and hence is a Nash equilibrium by (2) again.
Remark. The additional restrictions on X 0 in Theorem 5.2 could be dropped if we required Condition 2 in the definition of a BR-closed subset to hold for transfinite Cournot paths as well.
To extend Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 to games with a partial Cournot potential, more serious modifications are needed. First, we call a subset X 0 ⊆ X N BR-accessible if a finite Cournot path ending in X 0 can be started from every strategy profile in X N . Generally, a BR-closed subset need not be BR-accessible; therefore, we virtually have to add such an assumption. Even after that, more assumptions are needed. We provide three different sets of such additions. In each case, the proof follows the same scheme as that of Theorem 3.5, but with some modifications in the construction of the "right" Cournot path and in how the final contradiction is obtained.
The following assumption is the most complicated when looked at, but the most convenient to apply:
The condition may look intolerably artificial, but it is satisfied, e.g., if ≻ can be represented by a function P :
Theorem 5.3. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space and each R i be upper hemicontinuous. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive and lower semicontinuous partial Cournot potential ≻ with a BR-accessible subset X 0 ⊆ X N such that the condition (4) holds. Then for every x N ∈ X N there exists a Cournot path starting at x N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Given x N ∈ X N , we start with a finite Cournot path ending in X 0 . Once there, we recursively define a Cournot path ⟨x k
. If N * (k) = ∅, x k N is a Nash equilibrium, and we are already home. Otherwise, X * (k) is compact and X * (k) ⊆ X 0 since the latter is BR-closed. Then we pick a maximizer x k+1
for a cluster point of the path, we pick y N ∈ X N such that y N ◃ BR i x ω N ; hence y N ≻ x ω N by (2) . Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, we have
, we immediately have a contradiction with the choice of x k h +1 N . Otherwise, we pick a z i ∈ R i (x k h −i ) and obtain the same contradiction, applying (4) with
Theorem 5.4. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space and each R i be upper hemicontinuous. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive and lower semicontinuous partial Cournot potential ≻ with a BR-accessible subset X 0 = ∏ i∈N X 0 i ⊆ X N . Then for every x N ∈ X N there exists a Cournot path starting at x N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 5.3, we start with a finite Cournot path ending in X 0 , and then recursively define a Cournot path ⟨x k N ⟩ k in X 0 , picking a maximizer x k+1
Supposing, to the contrary, that x ω i / ∈ R i (x ω −i ) for a cluster point of the path, we pick y N ∈ X N such that y N ◃ BR i x ω N ; hence y N ∈ X 0 since X 0 is BR-absorbing; hence y i ∈ X 0 i and hence (y i ,
with the same contradiction.
Theorem 5.5. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space and each R i be upper hemicontinuous. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive and lower semicontinuous partial Cournot potential ≻ with a BR-accessible subset X 0 ⊆ X N such that the condition
Then for every x N ∈ X N there exists a Cournot path starting at x N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 5.3, we start with a finite Cournot path ending in X 0 . Once there, we recursively define a Cournot path ⟨x k N ⟩ k in X 0 , picking a maximizer x k+1
, which exists for the same reasons as in the proof of Theorem 5.2. Obviously, 
When #N = 2, one would like to drop the upper hemicontinuity assumption in Theorems 5.3 -5.5 in the same manner as in Theorem 3.6. In the last case, this is done in exactly the same way without any problem. In the other cases, there emerges a problem with the central construction of the Cournot path: the existence of a maximizer of ≻ on X * (k) cannot be taken for granted. The problem can be solved by assuming that, for every i ∈ N and
The assumption is not innocuous, but weaker than the upper hemicontinuity. Then X * (k) will be compact and hence Theorem 1 from Kukushkin (2008) will be applicable. In the case of Theorem 5.4, a broader assumption will do: for each i ∈ N , either X 0 i or every
will be compact and every maximizer of ≻ on X * (k) will belong to X 0 .
Given correspondences R
for every i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i ("admissible best responses"), we define the admissible best response improvement relation ◃ ABR on X N by replacing (1) with
We call an irreflexive and transitive binary relation ≻ on X N a restricted Cournot potential if there are correspondences R * i :
Remark. If we define admissible best responses by R * i (x −i ) := R i (x −i ) for all i ∈ N and x −i ∈ X −i , then every restricted Cournot potential is just a Cournot potential. When all best responses are single-valued, as in Section 4, there is no other way to define admissible best responses.
Theorem 5.6. Lemmas 2.2 and 3.3, as well as Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, remain valid if the "Cournot potential" in each of them is replaced with "restricted Cournot potential," the assumptions on R i are shifted onto R * i , and only admissible Cournot paths are allowed.
A straightforward proof is omitted. To extend Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 to games with a restricted Cournot potential, we need an additional assumption, somewhat similar to (4):
The assumption is satisfied, e.g., if ≻ can be represented by a function P :
Theorem 5.7. Let each X i in a strategic game Γ be a compact metric space. Let Γ admit an ω-transitive and lower semicontinuous restricted Cournot potential ≻ such that each R * i is upper hemicontinuous and (6) is satisfied. Then for every x 0 N ∈ X N there exists an admissible Cournot path starting at x 0 N and converging to the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Given x 0 N ∈ X N , we recursively define a Cournot path ⟨x k N ⟩ k in X 0 in a way similar to the proofs of Theorems 3.5 and 5.3. Given
. If N * (k) = ∅, x k N is a Nash equilibrium, and we are already home. Otherwise, we pick a maximizer x k+1 N = (x k+1 i(k) , x k −i(k) ) of ≻ on X * (k), which exists because X * (k) is compact. By definition, we have
for a cluster point of the path, we argue similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.3. First, we pick y N for which y N ◃ ABR When #N = 2, we can drop the upper hemicontinuity assumption in Theorem 5.7, demanding instead that every
Games with structured utilities
A game with structured utilities (and additive aggregation) may have an arbitrary finite set of players N and arbitrary sets of strategies whereas the utility functions satisfy certain structural requirements. There is a set A of processes and a finite subset Υ i ⊆ A of processes where each player i ∈ N participates (given exogenously). With every α ∈ A, an intermediate utility function is associated,
The "ultimate" utility functions of the players are built of the intermediate utilities:
where i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N . Defining P : X N → R by
we immediately see that P is an exact potential (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) :
for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N ; clearly, it is a Cournot potential as well. If all functions ϕ α are continuous, then P is continuous too. If we additionally assume, e.g., each set X i to be convex and each function ϕ α strictly concave, then the results of Section 4 become applicable.
Remark. A strategic game admits an exact potential if and only if it can be represented as a game with structured utilities and additive aggregation rule (7), see Kukushkin (2007, Theorem 5) .
Utility functions satisfying (7) can be found in so called "network transmission games," see, e.g., Facchinei et al. (2011) and references therein, which are somewhat similar to Rosenthal's (1973) congestion games, but do not belong to the class. There is a directed graph with the set of links E; each player i ∈ N is assigned a path π i ⊆ E in the graph (between a source and a target) and sends a flow x i ∈ [0, b i ] ⊂ R along the path, getting a reward w i (x i ) depending on her flow and bearing costs ∑ e∈π i c e ( ∑ j: e∈π j x j ) depending on the total flow through each link in π i . Setting A := E ∪ N , Υ i := π i ∪ {i}, ϕ i (x i ) := w i (x i ) and ϕ e (x N (e) ) := −c e ( ∑ j∈N (e) x j ) for each e ∈ E, we see that (7) holds for each player.
The notion of a partial Cournot potential is handy in the case of a Cournot oligopoly with a linear inverse demand function (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . The strategies are X i := [0, K i ]; the utilities,
where a, b > 0 and C : R + → R + is increasing and such that C(0) = 0. Denoting X 0 := {x N ∈ X N | a − b · ∑ i∈N x i ≥ 0} and assuming X 0 ̸ = ∅ (otherwise, there is nothing to discuss here), we easily check that X 0 is both BR-closed and BR-accessible, and the function
represents a partial Cournot potential satisfying (4) on X 0 . Thus, Theorems 5.1 and 5.3 are applicable. Given continuous and strictly increasing mappings λ i : R → R, we may extend this approach further, replacing (7) with
for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N . Then P (x N ) := ∑ α∈A ϕ α (x N (α) ) is an ordinal potential, hence a continuous Cournot potential again. This trick works, e.g., for the Cournot oligopoly with identical linear cost functions (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Kukushkin, 1994) :
otherwise, there is nothing to discuss here again), we may pick ε > 0 such that
It is easily checked now that X 0 is both BR-closed and BRaccessible, and the function
represents a partial Cournot potential on X 0 [the logarithm of P is of the form (8)]. Thus, Theorems 5.1 and 5.5 are applicable. A partial Cournot potential for the voluntary provision of a public good with Cobb-Douglas utilities can be constructed very similarly.
Aggregative games with the single crossing conditions
A rather general (though not the most general imaginable) definition of an aggregative game sounds as follows: each X i is a compact subset of R, and there are mappings σ i :
for all i ∈ N and x N ∈ X N . For each i ∈ N , we denote S i := σ i (X −i ) ⊂ R, and redefine the best response correspondence:
Our assumption R i (x −i ) ̸ = ∅ is equivalent to R i (s i ) ̸ = ∅ for each s i ∈ S i . We also assume that each player's best responses are increasing in s i (in a rather strong sense):
for all i ∈ N and s ′ i , s i ∈ S i . The following strict single crossing condition (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) is sufficient for (10):
If each σ i is increasing in each x j , then the existence of a Nash equilibrium (but not the acyclicity of the best response improvements) immediately follows from Tarski's fixed point theorem. Novshek (1985) was the first to notice that the existence also obtains in the case of σ i (x −i ) = − ∑ j̸ =i x j ; this fact has nothing to do with Tarski's theorem. Kukushkin (2004) proved the impossibility of Cournot cycles in both Novshek' case and when σ i (x −i ) = ∑ j̸ =i x j . Dubey et al. (2006) modified a trick invented by Huang (2002) for different purposes, providing a tool for the construction of a continuous partial Cournot potential. A rather broad class of aggregative games where the trick works is described in Jensen (2010) ; the class may be the broadest possible although it is unclear how such a claim could be proven. (The technical assumptions of Jensen's main theorem, however, should have been much stronger.)
We describe the trick in some details for a case of intermediate generality (Kukushkin, 2005) , sufficient for many applications in economics. Let
with a ij = a ji ∈ R for all i ̸ = j. Assuming that each best response correspondence R i is upper hemicontinuous and satisfies (10), the approach of Huang-Dubey-et-al. recommends the following steps. First, we pick a selection r i from each R i , e.g., r i (s i ) := min R i (s i ) for every s i ∈ S i ; then we extend r i to the whole closed interval [min S i , max S i ] preserving its monotonicity; finally, we define
] .
Straightforward calculations show that
. Therefore, P represents a continuous partial Cournot potential satisfying (2) on X 0 := ∏ i∈N X 0 i . Thus, Theorems 5.1, 5.3, and 5.4 are applicable.
Example 8.1. Let us consider a game where N := {1, 2}, X i := [0, 1] ∪ {2}, and the preferences are defined by these utility functions:
Each utility function u i is upper semicontinuous in x N and continuous in x i ; the only discontinuity in x −i happens when x −i = 1 and x i = 2. The best responses are easy to compute:
There is a unique Nash equilibrium, (2, 2) .
To define a Cournot potential, we introduce an auxiliary function on R 2 : ψ(x, y) := min{x, −x + y + 1}. Then we define a continuous function on X N : 
Since R i are not upper hemicontinuous, neither Theorem 3.2, nor Theorem 3.4 is applicable here. Indeed, a Cournot path converging to (1, 1), which is not an equilibrium, can be started from every strategy profile in [0, 1[×[0, 1[. On the other hand, Theorem 3.6 is applicable; actually, the unique Nash equilibrium can be reached from every strategy profile after, at most, two best response improvements.
Example 8.2. Let us consider a game where N := {1, 2, 3}, X 1 := X 2 := [0, 1], X 3 := {0, 1}, and the preferences are defined by these utility functions:
Both functions u 1 , u 2 are continuous in x N ; u 3 is upper semicontinuous in x N and continuous in x 3 . The best responses are easy to compute:
There is a unique Nash equilibrium, (1, 1, 1) .
To define a Cournot potential, we use the same auxiliary function on R 2 : ψ(x, y) := min{x, −x + y + 1} and define a continuous function on X N by P (x N ) := max{ψ(x 1 , x 2 ), ψ(x 2 , x 1 )} + x 3 . Claim 8.2.1. If y N ◃ BR x N , then P (y N ) > P (x N ), i.e., P represents a Cournot potential.
Proof of Claim 8.2.1. For players 1 or 2, the argument is the same as in the proof of Claim 8.1.1, one only has to consider fewer cases. The situation y N ◃ BR 3 x N is only possible when y −3 = x −3 = (1, 1), x 3 = 0 and y 3 = 1.
Every Cournot path started from [0, 1[×[0, 1[×{0} converges to (1, 1, 0) , which is not an equilibrium. Thus, the upper hemicontinuity assumption in Theorem 3.5, as well as the assumption #N = 2 in Theorem 3.6, are essential.
Example 8.3. In a plane with polar coordinates (ρ, ϕ) (ρ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ϕ < 2π), we define a compact subset
and a mapping f : X → X by
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2π. Clearly, f is continuous and (1, 0) is its unique fixed point. Defining X 0 := {(ρ, ϕ) ∈ X | ρ = 1} and X * := X \ X 0 , we immediately see that f k (x) converges to (1, 0) whenever x ∈ X 0 and to X 0 whenever x ∈ X * . Now we define a strategic game:
where d denotes distance in the plane. Both utilities are continuous; the best responses are unique,
The strategy profile ((1, 0), (1, 0)) is a unique Nash equilibrium.
Then we define a function P : X × X → R in this way:
The function is upper semicontinuous, but not continuous.
i.e., P represents a Cournot potential.
Proof of Claim 8.3.1. Let
. If x −i = (1, 0), then P (x N ) < 0 = P (x ′ N ) and we are home. Let ρ −i = 1 and ϕ −i > 0. Then
We see that the assumptions of Theorem 3.2 are satisfied. Moreover, the potential is upper semicontinuous, and the best responses are single-valued. Meanwhile, every Cournot path started from X * × X * has an infinite number of cluster points besides the unique equilibrium, i.e., does not converge to the set of equilibria. Thus, the lower semicontinuity of the potential in Theorem 3.4 is essential.
Example 8.4. We consider a modification of Example 8.3 with the same subset X
of the plane with polar coordinates and a different continuous mapping f : X → X,
where ⊕ again denotes addition modulo 2π. Defining X 0 := {(ρ, ϕ) ∈ X | ρ = 1} and X * := X \ X 0 , we immediately see that f (x) = x whenever x ∈ X 0 , and f k (x) converges to X 0 whenever x ∈ X * . Now we define a strategic game in exactly the same way as in Example 8.3: N := {1, 2}, X 1 := X 2 := X, u i (x N ) := −d(x i , f (x −i )), where d denotes distance in the plane. Again, both utilities are continuous; the best responses are unique,
Then we define a continuous function P : X × X → R by
An argument similar to the proof of Claim 8.3.1, but even simpler, shows that P represents a Cournot potential. Meanwhile, the set of cluster points of any Cournot path started from X * × X * is the whole set of Nash equilibria of the game. We see that the assumptions of Theorem 3.4, even Theorem 4.4, do not ensure the convergence of every Cournot path to a Nash equilibrium.
The following example is essentially due to Powell (1973) .
Example 8.5. Let us consider a game where N := {1, 2, 3}, X i := [−2, 2], and the preferences of each player are defined by the same continuous utility function:
Clearly, u is an exact potential of the game; hence it represents a continuous Cournot potential. Note that the game belongs to the class considered in Section 7 with σ i (x −i ) := ∑ j̸ =i x j ; the strict single crossing condition (11) is easy to check. Note also that u is concave in each x i .
The best responses are easy to compute; given i ∈ N and
There are two Nash equilibria maximizing the utility/potential: (2, 2, 2) and (−2, −2, −2). (0, 0, 0) is also a Nash equilibrium.
Fixing an arbitrary δ ∈]0, 1/4[, we consider a sequential Cournot path starting at x 0 N := (1 + 4δ, −1 − 2δ, 1 + δ): x 1 N = (−1 − δ/2, −1 − 2δ, 1 + δ); x 2 N = (−1 − δ/2, 1 + δ/4, 1 + δ); x 3 N = (−1 − δ/2, 1 + δ/4, −1 − δ/8); x 4 N = (1 + δ/16, 1 + δ/4, −1 − δ/8); x 5 N = (1 + δ/16, −1 − δ/32, −1 − δ/8); x 6 N = (1 + δ/16, −1 − δ/32, 1 + δ/64). Comparing x 0 N and x 6 N , we see how the path will continue ad infinitum. Thus, it has six cluster points: (1, −1, 1), (−1, −1, 1), (−1, 1, 1), (−1, 1, −1), (1, 1, −1) , and (1, −1, −1), none of which is an equilibrium.
We see that Theorem 3.4 cannot be extended to n > 2, while Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 are wrong without the uniqueness of the best responses.
Example 8.6. Having in mind the same set X := {(ρ, ϕ) | 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 2} and mapping f : X → X as in Example 8.4, we consider a strategic game with N := {1, 2, 3}, X 1 := X 2 := X, X 3 := [0, π], and a common utility function of all players
and 0 < ∆ < π/2. Clearly, P is continuous, and represents a Cournot potential of the game.
When x 3 = 0, the best responses of players 1 and 2 are the same as in Example 8.4: R 1 (x −1 )
= {f (x 1 )}. Therefore, the set of cluster points of any Cournot path such that
. The utility function u 3 (x N ) is piecemeal-quadratic in x 3 and it is easily checked that it strictly increases when x 3 ≤ ψ(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) and strictly decreases when x 3 ≥ ψ(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ); therefore, R 3 (x 1 , x 2 ) = {ψ(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )}.
Thus, we see that the best responses along the Cournot path, as well as at every cluster point, are unique. Moreover, the path is totally inclusive since x k 3 ∈ R 3 (x k −3 ) whenever ψ(ϕ k 1 , ϕ k 2 ) = 0, which happens an infinite number of times. However, not every cluster point is an equilibrium (only those points where ψ(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) = 0). In other words, Theorem 3.4 cannot be extended to #N > 2 even under the uniqueness of the best responses.
Example 8.7. Let us add one more player to Example 8.6, and one more additive term to the common utility function. Thus, N := {1, 2, 3, 4}, X 1 := X 2 := X, X 3 := X 4 := [0, π], and u i (x N ) := P (x N ) := − min{d(x 1 , f (x 2 )), d(x 2 , f (x 1 ))} + min{1 − ρ 1 , 1 − ρ 2 }+
where X, f , ψ and ∆ are the same as in Example 8.6, whereas ψ * (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) := max{min{|ϕ 1 − π| , |ϕ 2 − π|} − ∆, 0}.
Again, P is continuous and represents a Cournot potential of the game. When x 3 = x 4 = 0, the best responses of players 1 and 2 are again the same as in Example 8.4: R 1 (x −1 )
x 3 =x 4 =0 = {f (x 2 )} and R 2 (x −2 )
x 3 =x 4 =0 = {f (x 1 )}. Therefore, every Cournot path such that x 0 3 = x 0 4 = 0, ρ 0 1 > ρ 0 2 > 1, x 2k+1 N ◃ BR 1 x 2k N and x 2k+2 N ◃ BR 2 x 2k+1 N has the same set {x N ∈ X N | ρ 1 = ρ 2 = 1, ϕ 1 = ϕ 2 , x 3 = x 4 = 0} as the set of cluster points. Similarly to the preceding example, R 3 (x −3 ) = {ψ(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )} and R 4 (x −4 ) = {ψ * (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 )}.
Again, the best responses along the totally inclusive Cournot path, as well as at every cluster point, are unique. However, there is no equilibrium among the cluster points of the path because the equalities ψ(ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) = 0 and ψ * (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) = 0 are incompatible. In other words, Theorem 4.5 would be just wrong for #N > 3. 9 Concluding remarks 9.1. ω-transitivity of a Cournot potential alone ensures the "transfinite convergence" of every Cournot path to Nash equilibria; a formal exposition can be found in Kukushkin (2010) . The concept might seem exotic, but there is something to it. If, e.g., we replace all X i = [−2, 2] in Example 8.5 with arbitrary finite subsets, retaining the same common utility function, then every Cournot path will reach an equilibrium in a finite number of steps. Therefore, one can argue that the problem illustrated by the example is just an artefact of the suboptimal way to introduce infinity: the behavior of transfinite dynamics is much closer to what happens in a finite model.
9.2.
It is worth stressing once again: None of the results of this paper needs a numeric potential; moreover, in each of the "counterexamples" in Section 8, there is a numeric potential, which does not help. The upper semicontinuity of a Cournot potential does not ensure any better properties of best response dynamics than just ω-transitivity. And a continuous Cournot potential also seems not to have any advantage over an ω-transitive and lower semicontinuous one. 9.3. Similarly to the preceding remark, a "best-response potential" (Voorneveld, 2000) gives no advantage over a Cournot potential as defined here. The only difference is that the continuity of a best-response potential implies the upper hemicontinuity of all best response correspondences, hence Theorem 3.5 absorbs Theorem 3.6, and Examples 8.1 or 8.2 become impossible. 9.4. If the Cournot potential in Lemma 4.1 is continuous, then each r i will be continuous too. Under the actual assumptions of the lemma such a claim would be wrong. 9.5. Theorem 2 of Jensen (2010) is neither weaker, nor stronger than any result of this paper. It establishes the convergence of sequential Cournot tâtonnement to Nash equilibria under an assumption concerning paths were the players consecutively replace one best response with another. The assumption is automatically satisfied if all best responses are single-valued, in which case our Theorem 4.4 is a bit stronger. It is worth noting that Example 8.2 shows Jensen's theorem to be, strictly speaking, wrong (upper semiconinuity of utility functions is not enough). 9.7. The Cournot path leading nowhere in Example 8.5 needs a carefully chosen initial point. It does not matter here since the only objective of the example is to demonstrate the invalidity of straightforward extensions of Theorems 3.4 and 4.4. Powell (1973) also provides a more complicated example where such paths can be started from every point in an open subset. 9.8. Most likely, Example 8.6 can be modified so that only one cluster point will be an equilibrium (∆ in the definition of ψ should depend on ρ 1 and ρ 2 ). However, this is hardly important for anything. A much more intriguing question is whether Theorem 3.4 would still be wrong for #N > 2, and Theorem 4.5 for #N > 3, if all best responses were assumed to be single-valued everywhere. The constructions of Examples 8.6 and 8.7 seem not to allow an appropriate modification. 9.9. Everything in this paper is about games with ordinal preferences. For applications of the idea of potential games to the best responses in the context of cardinal utilities, see, e.g., Morris and Ui (2004) .
